The Georgia Legislature Strikes with a Vengeance! Sex Offender Residency Restrictions & the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto Clause by West, Amanda
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 57 
Issue 1 Fall 2007 Article 7 
2007 
The Georgia Legislature Strikes with a Vengeance! Sex Offender 
Residency Restrictions & the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause 
Amanda West 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Amanda West, The Georgia Legislature Strikes with a Vengeance! Sex Offender Residency Restrictions & 
the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 239 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol57/iss1/7 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE GEORGIA LEGISLATURE STRIKES WITH A
VENGEANCE! SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS & THE DETERIORATION OF THE
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
Amanda West'
In 2006, Georgia enacted a residency restriction that was "[h]ailed by
its sponsors as the 'toughest [sex offender] law in the country.""
Residency restrictions like the one enacted in Georgia represent a novel
development in criminal law.2 Since 2001, when the first sex offender
residency restriction was enacted, 3 twenty-two states have passed someS• 4
form of sex offender residency restriction. Such restrictions either
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1. Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, 2006 Ga. Laws 379 (H.B. 1059); see also Jenny
Jarvie, Suit Targets Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at A24.
2. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that sex offender
residency restrictions have a recent origin, similar to sex offender registration laws).
3. MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, THE IMPACT OF
RESIDENCY RESTRICrIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 15 (2006), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/
06/08/06-008.pdf.
4. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) ("[N]o adult criminal sex
offender shall establish a residence or any other living accommodation or accept
employment within 2,000 feet of the property on which any school or child care facility is
located."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006) ("It is unlawful for a sex offender who
is required to register ... and who has been assessed as a Level 3 or Level 4 offender to
reside within two thousand feet (2,000') of the property on which any public or private
elementary or secondary school or daycare facility is located."); CAL. PENAL CODE
§3003(g)(1) (West Supp. 2007) ("[A]n inmate who is released on parole for any violation
of [the sex offender statute] shall not be placed or reside, for the duration of his or her
period of parole, within one-quarter mile of any public or private school ...."); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007) (prohibiting a sex offender whose
"victim was under the age of 18 ... [from] living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care
center, park, playground, designated public school bus stop, or other place where children
regularly congregate"); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006) ("No individual
required to register ... shall reside or loiter within 1,000 feet of any child care facility,
church, school, or area where minors congregate."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
9.3(b-5) (West 2002) ("It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within
500 feet of a school building ...."); IND. CODE ANN. § 1l-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (LexisNexis
2003) (requiring the parole board to "prohibit the offender from residing within one
thousand (1,000) feet of school property ... for the period of parole, unless the offender
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create "[c]hild safety zone[s]," which prohibit a sex offender from
loitering in a certain area, or impose "[d]istance [m]arker[s]," which
obtains written approval from the parole board"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2) (West
2003) ("A person shall not reside within two thousand feet of... a public or nonpublic
elementary or secondary school or a child care facility."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.545(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) ("No registrant ... shall reside within one thousand
(1,000) feet of a high school, middle school, elementary school, preschool, publicly owned
playground, or licensed day care facility."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A) (Supp.
2007) ("Unlawful presence of a sexually violent predator is ... (2) [t]he physical residing
of a sexually violent predator within one thousand feet of any public or private elementary
or secondary school, a day care facility, playground, public or private youth center, public
swimming pool or free standing video arcade facility."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
28.735(1) (West Supp. 2007) ("[A]n individual required to be registered ... shall not
reside within a student safety zone."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052(3)(k) (West Supp.
2007) ("If the [end-of-confinement review] committee assigns a predatory offender to risk
level III, the committee shall determine whether residency restrictions shall be included in
the conditions of the offender's release .... "); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West Supp.
2007) ("Any person who [is a sex offender] ... shall not reside within one thousand feet of
any public school ... or any private school ... or child-care facility .... ); N.M. STAT.
§ 29-11A-5.1(D) (2004) ("[T]he county sheriff shall contact every licensed daycare
center, elementary school, middle school and high school within a one-mile radius of the
sex offender's residence and provide them with the sex offender's registration information
.... "); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (LexisNexis 2006) ("No person who has
been convicted of... either a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt
sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or
occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of any school premises."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West Supp. 2007) ("It is unlawful for any person registered
pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act to reside, either temporarily or
permanently, within a two-thousand-foot radius of any public or private school site,
educational institution, playground, park, or licensed child care facility."); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 144.642(1) (2005) (directing the Department of Corrections to "establish[] criteria to be
considered in determining the permanent residence requirements for a sex offender,"
which rules "shall include ... (a) [a] general prohibition against allowing a sex offender to
reside near locations where children are the primary occupants or users"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006) ("No person who is required to register as a sex offender ...
may establish a residence or reside within a community safety zone .... "); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006) ("[N]o sexual offender ... or violent sexual offender, ...
whose victim was a minor, shall knowingly establish a primary or secondary residence or
any other living accommodation ... within one thousand feet (1,000') . . . of any public
school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, other child care facility,
public park, playground, recreation center or public athletic field available for use by the
general public."); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.187(b) (Vernon 2004) ("A parole panel
shall establish a child safety zone applicable to a releasee .... ); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.712(6)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2007) ("If . . . the victim of the offense was under
eighteen years of age at the time of the offense, the court shall ... prohibit the offender
from residing in a community protection zone."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-26(b)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007) ("[Certain sex offenders] shall be . . . prohibited from:
[e]stablishing a residence or accepting employment within one thousand feet of a school or
child care facility .... ). Outside of these states, "hundreds of municipalities" have also
added residency restrictions. NIETO & JUNG, supra note 3, at 3.
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prohibit a sex offender from living within a particular distance from a
certain place.'
The Georgia law imposes distance markers that restrict registered sex
offenders from living within "1,000 feet of any child care facility, church,
school, or area where minors congregate., 6 The law additionally includes
school bus stops as an "area where minors congregate."7 As soon as
school bus stops were added to the list of restricted areas, sex offenders
challenged the constitutionality of the residency restriction in Whitaker v.
Perdue.'
Georgia's sex offender residency restriction violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution because
the law retroactively punishes, rather than regulates, previously
convicted sex offenders.9 If courts uphold punitive residency restrictions
like the Georgia statute, the Ex Post Facto Clause will become a mere
surplusage.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of the Georgia sex
offender residency restriction in light of the Ex Post Facto Clause. °
5. NIETO & JUNG, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining that "Child Safety Zones" impose
loitering restrictions on "areas where children congregate, such as schools, childcare
centers, playgrounds, school bus stops, video arcades and amusement parks," while
"Distance Marker laws restrict sex offenders from permanently residing within a certain
distance of designated places").
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006).
7. Id. § 42-1-12(a)(3). The term "[a]reas where minors congregate" covers "all
public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks,
neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and public and community
swimming pools." Id. To qualify under the statute, a school bus stop must be "designated
[as a stop] by local school boards of education or by a private school." Id. § 42-1-
12(a)(19). No other state restricts all registered sex offenders from residing near school
bus stops. See id. § 42-1-12(e) (specifying when registration is required, without reference
to the age of the victim); Jarvie, supra note 1 ("Georgia ... is the first state to prohibit
living near school bus stops."). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West Supp.
2007) (restricting a sex offender from living near a "designated public school bus stop" if
the offender's victim was younger than eighteen years old).
8. See generally Complaint, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 20,
2006), available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059jlitigation/
LegalDocuments[HB1059_- Complaint.pdf.
9. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (explaining that laws that are intended as
regulatory measures, but are retroactively punitive in effect, violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
10. During publication of this article, the Georgia Supreme Court issued an opinion
on November 21, 2007, stating that "'§ 42-1-15(a) [of the Georgia Code] is
unconstitutional because it permits the regulatory taking of appellant's property without
just and adequate compensation."' Press Release, Supreme Court of Georgia, Supreme
Court Issues Substitute Opinion in Sex Offender Ruling (Dec. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.gasupreme.us/press-releases/mann mfr.pdf. However, the Georgia Supreme
Court issued a substitute opinion on December 13, 2007, substituting the word "because"
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First, this Comment presents an overview of the Ex Post Facto Clause
and the Supreme Court's test set out in Smith v. Doe," which is used to
analyze challenges to potentially ex post facto statutes. Second, this
Comment reviews how federal and state courts have applied the Smith
test to residency restrictions in the last two years. Third, this Comment
analyzes the constitutionality of the Georgia residency restriction, as
challenged in Whitaker. Finally, this Comment discusses the potential
implications of Whitaker on ex post facto jurisprudence.
I. THE HISTORY OF Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO SEX
OFFENDER RESIDENCY STATUTES
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause Safeguards Citizens from the
Vengeance of Public Officials
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution states that "[n]o State shall...
pass any ... ex post facto Law., 12 Without further explanation, as Justice
Chase observed in 1798 in Calder v. Bull, this phrase in the Constitution
"is unintelligible, and means nothing."'
3
with the phrase, "to the extent that." Id. The revised opinion states that "§ 42-1-15(a) is
unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the regulatory taking of appellant's property
without just and adequate compensation." Mann v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections, No.
S07A1043, 2007 WL 4142738, at *5 (Ga. Nov. 21, 2007) (emphasis added). Russ Willard,
spokesman for the Attorney General of Georgia, stated that the new ruling "'should only
protect property owners, not all registered sex offenders, from the residency restriction."'
Bill Rankin, High Court Clarifies Residency Ruling, ATL. J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 2007, at El0.
But see id. ("Sarah Geraghty, a lawyer for the Southern Center for Human Rights,
disagreed with the attorney general's office's interpretation: 'Courts in Georgia have
repeatedly held that people who rent their homes have a property interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment"'). Thus, sex offenders who rent are still subject to the residency
restriction in section 42-1-15(a). See id. In response to the ruling of the Georgia Supreme
Court, members of the Georgia legislature prefiled a bill to repeal certain provisions of the
residency restriction. H.R. 908, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007). The new bill
retains the residency restrictions of the old law, including the school bus stop provision.
Id. However, the bill contains an exception for sex offenders who own their homes before
the establishment of a child care facility, church, school, or other area where minors
congregate. Id. If this bill is passed, the residency restriction would still apply to offenders
who rent or offenders who want to buy a home in a restricted area. At this time, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has dismissed all claims
in Whitaker v. Perdue, except for the ex post facto challenge. Order at 22, Whitaker v.
Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2007); see also id. at 31 (dismissing plaintiff's
claim made pursuant to the Takings Clause), available at http://www.schr.org/
aboutthecenter/pressreleases[HB 1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/Order.re.Def.Mt %20to
%20Dismiss.03.30.07.pdf.
11. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-97 (applying a two-part test, hereinafter referred to as the
Smith test, to determine whether a statute is ex post facto).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting
Congress from enacting ex post facto laws).
13. 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386,390 (1798) (Chase, J.).
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The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws was added in
response to certain laws passed by the Parliament of Great Britain. "
These laws declared past acts to be treasonous though they were not
treasonous when committed, imposed punishment for acts that were not
criminal when committed, and decreed stricter punishment than the law
attached to the crime at conviction.'5 The Framers of the Constitution
feared the tyranny and endangerment of citizens' rights that resulted
from the imposition of these types of ex post facto laws.16
Calder was the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 7 In Calder, Justice Chase explained
that a statute is ex post facto if it (1) punishes an act that was not criminal
when committed, (2) "aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed," (3) creates a harsher punishment for a crime after the
crime was committed, or (4) "alters the legal rules of evidence" after the
commission of the offense for the purpose of obtaining a conviction."
Barring various types of ex post facto laws prevents legislators from
14. Id. at 389 ("The prohibition against [state legislatures'] making any ex post facto
laws . . . very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain
claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws . .
15. Id.
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 248-49 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., William S.
Hein & Co., Inc. 2002) (1898). Even though state constitutions and charters already
prohibited ex post facto laws, the Framers also forbade these laws in the Constitution,
having found them dangerous to "personal security and private rights," id. at 249, and
"contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
legislation," id. at 248. The Framers feared ex post facto laws as "the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny," THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra, at 468, created in response to the "fluctuating policy" of the legislature, THE
FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra, at 249. A prohibition of ex post facto laws
in the Federal Constitution would provide "perhaps greater securities to liberty" than
would any state's constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at
468.
17. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386; Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (explaining
the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause as originally set out in Calder). In Calder, the
probate court for Hartford, Connecticut found a certain will invalid; two years later, the
Connecticut legislature passed a law that set aside the decision of the probate court.
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386. After a new hearing, the probate court found the will valid.
Id. Justice Chase concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because "the true
construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases." Id. at 399.
18. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (emphasis omitted); see also Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003) (describing Justice Chase's categorization of forbidden laws as
"an authoritative account of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause"); De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The mark of an ex post facto law is the
imposition of what can fairly be designated punishment for past acts."); Beazell v. Ohio,
269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925) (stating that ex post facto laws are "harsh and oppressive").
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enacting laws that are "arbitrary or vindictive" and ensures that "statutes
give fair warning of their effect."'19
B. Courts Apply the Smith Test to Determine Whether a Statute is
Ex Post Facto
Various state sex offender laws have been challenged for violating the
Ex Post Facto Clause because they allegedly create a harsher punishment
after the sex offender has already been punished for the crime.20  In
Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court analyzed an ex post facto challenge to a
sex offender notification and registration law.2'  The two-part test
developed in Smith is the current test that courts apply when determining
whether a sex offender residency law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.22
The first step of the Smith test is to determine whether the legislature
acted with a punitive intent in creating the law." To determine whetherthe legislature's objective was punitive, the court examines the statute's
19. People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); see Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (explaining how political pressures may lead to the
development of retroactive legislation to punish politically unpopular groups); Calder, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 389 ("With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were
stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice." (emphasis
omitted)).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) (Alaska's sex offender registration
law); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 253-54 (2001) (Washington's civil commitment
statute); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (Kansas's civil commitment
statute); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997) (New Jersey's public
notification statute); Hamm v. Ray, 531 S.E.2d 91, 92 (Ga. 2000) (overruling parole
board's requirement of payment of an electronic monitoring fee and payment of a
reimbursement fee to victims where payment requirements were enacted after
conviction).
21. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. Although the offenders were convicted prior to passage of
the statute, they were nevertheless required to comply with the restrictions of the statute.
Id. at 91.
22. E.g., Bret R. Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep
Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 980 & n.121 (2006)
(stating that courts addressing the constitutionality of residency restrictions have applied
the Smith analysis, which considered the constitutionality of registration-notification laws).
There has been some debate over the proper origin of the Smith test. See, e.g., id. at 979-
80 (explaining that the factors used in the Smith test arose from the factors originally
enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). But see
Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 730 (2005) (stating that the five factors of the Smith
test and the seven factors of Mendoza-Martinez are different tests); Note, Prevention
Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex
Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1720-22 (1996) (arguing that the factors used in
Mendoza-Martinez were never "intended ... to be applied as a litmus test by which to
characterize legislation," that use of the test would lead to inconsistent results, and that
some of the factors are unsuitable for analysis of sex offender statutes).
23. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
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text, structure, and the express or implied intent of the legislature. 24
Courts also review the "formal attributes" of the statute's enactment.2 If
the intent of the legislature is punitive, then the law violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause without need for further analysis.26  Thus, courts accord
considerable deference to the stated intent of the legislature.27
If the legislature enacts the law as part of a civil and nonpunitive
regulatory scheme, then a court should apply step two of the Smith test
to determine whether the statute is punitive in effect.i The Court in
Smith analyzed the punitive effect of the statute by evaluating whether
"the regulatory scheme: [1)] has been regarded in our history and
traditions as a punishment; [2)] imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint; [3)] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4)] has a
rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5)] is excessive with
respect to this purpose., 29 These five factors are "'neither exhaustive nor
dispositive,"' but are intended to be "useful guideposts" in analyzing the
24. Id. at 92-93.
25. Id. at 94 (explaining that the formal attributes of the enactment of a statute
include "the manner of [a law's] codification or the enforcement procedures it
establishes"). Although the location and labels of provisions are factors used when
determining legislative intent, "these factors ... are not dispositive." Id.
Additionally, even if a provision is codified in the state's criminal procedure code, id. at
94-96, "[i]nvoking the criminal process in aid of a statutory regime" is not in itself evidence
of punitive intent, id. at 96. For example, the statute at issue in Smith required notification
of registration as a part of the plea colloquy or judgment of conviction. Id. The statute
gave the authority to implement the regulations to a state agency "charged with
enforcement of both criminal and civil regulatory laws." Id. Although the statute
involved use of the criminal process, the Court held that the statutory scheme was not
punitive but civil. Id.
26. Id. at 92. In Smith, however, the Court held that the legislative objective was
nonpunitive. Id. at 96. The legislature's express finding that "'sex offenders pose a high
risk of reoffending"' and its expressed purpose of "protecting the public from sex
offenders" persuaded the Court that Alaska's governmental interest was legitimate. Id. at
93 (citing 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1). Similarly, the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks
determined that imposing post-incarceration confinement of sex offenders determined to
be dangerous was "a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective." See Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997), cited in Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
27. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93.
28. Id. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; see De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144, 160 (1960) ("The question . .. where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear
upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that
individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a
relevant incident to a regulation ....").
29. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Court omits two of the Mendoza-Martinez factors. See
id. These factors are "whether [the law] comes into play only on a finding of scienter" and
"whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime." Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see also supra note 22.
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punitive effect of a statute lacking punitive intent. °  Although the
Supreme Court has not yet applied the Smith test to determine "the
validity of sex offender residency restrictions,"3 courts around the
country are adopting this two-step approach to determine the validity of
their state's residency restrictions.32
C. State and Federal Courts Have Used the Smith Test to Conclude That
State Residency Restrictions Do Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
Since the Supreme Court decided Smith, sex offenders across the
country have filed suits challenging residency restrictions on several
constitutional grounds.33 Of these grounds, the ex post facto challenges
30. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980),
and Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).
31. Hobson, supra note 22, at 967.
32. E.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 718-23 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the Smith test to
Iowa's statute that restricts sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of a school
or childcare facility); Does v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:06-CV-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL
2927598, at *8-9 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2006) (applying the Smith test to an Indianapolis city
ordinance that prohibits sex offenders from living or being found "within 1000 feet of
public playgrounds, recreation centers, swimming and wading pools, sports fields and
facilities" when children are present, unless such person is accompanied by an adult not
required to register as a sex offender); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1039-44 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2004) (applying the Smith test to Alabama's statute that restricts sex offenders from
living within two thousand feet of a school or daycare facility); People v. Leroy, 828
N.E.2d 769, 779-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying the Smith test to an Illinois statute
restricting sex offenders from living within five hundred feet of a school); State v. Seering,
701 N.W.2d 655, 659, 666-69 (Iowa 2005) (applying the Smith test to Iowa's statute
restricting sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of a school or childcare
facility); State v. Cupp, No. 21176, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1657, at *34, 11-13 (Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2006) (applying the Smith test to Ohio's statute that prohibits sex offenders from
residing within one thousand feet of a school); see, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police
Dep't., 453 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying the Smith test, as addressed in
Miller, to Arkansas's statute that restricts sex offenders from living within two thousand
feet of a school or daycare center).
In Doe v. Baker, a federal district court applied the Smith test to Georgia's residency
restriction law as enacted in 2003, before the law was amended to include school bus stops
within the definition of "'area where minors congregate."' No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265-, 2006
WL 905368, at *1, 3-6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006) (citation omitted). Compare Act of June 4,
2003, No. 382, § 1, 2003 Ga. Laws 878 (amending the definition to "include all public and
private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers,
gymnasiums, and similar facilities providing programs or services directed towards persons
under 18 years of age"), with Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, § 24, 2006 Ga. Laws 397
(amending the definition to "include all public and private parks and recreation facilities,
playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and
public and community swimming pools" (emphasis added)).
33. Hobson, supra note 22, at 970-71 & nn.55-65 ("Offenders have attacked the
constitutionality of [residency laws] on several grounds, including that the statutes are
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; permit a regulatory taking without just
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are garnering the majority of attention in court opinions. 34
1. Legislative Intent to Protect the Public
If the legislature intends to impose a criminal punishment upon sex
offenders, then its act is considered punitive. 5 Courts defer to the
legislature's stated objectives when determining whether the intent of the
36legislature is punitive. The burden to overcome this deference is high;





Thus far, courts have agreed that residency restrictions were not
created to punish sex offenders. 3s Instead, the courts have viewed the
residency restrictions as public safety laws intended to protect children
from known sex offenders.39 For example, in Weems v. Little Rock Police
Department, the Eighth Circuit analogized the residency restriction to a
registration act that promoted public safety by working in tandem withS • 40
the residency restriction. The court held that the restriction wastherefore an additional regulatory measure intended to promote public
compensation; interfere with the right to contract; constitute a bill of attainder; and violate
substantive due process, procedural due process, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, and the right to equal protection under the law." (footnotes
omitted)).
34. Id. at 978 (describing ex post facto challenges to sex offender residency
restrictions as having "received slightly more acceptance" from the courts, compared to
other constitutional challenges to the restrictions); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 32.
35. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
36. See id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
37. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
38. E.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006); Doe
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 718 (8th Cir. 2005); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (I11. App.
Ct. 2005); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667 (Iowa 2005); State v. Cupp, No. 21176,
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1657, at *11-12 (Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2006).
39. See Weems, 453 F.3d at 1017 (analyzing the statute's intent in light of the state's
registration statute, which works in conjunction with the challenged residency restriction
to protect public safety); Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (stating that the statute "protect[s] the
health and safety of Iowa citizens"); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Ala. Crim. App.
2004) (explaining that the law was created because the high rate of recidivism among sex
offenders endangers "vulnerable segments of the population" who should be protected by
residency restrictions); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 779 (stating that the statute protects children
from known sex offenders); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 667 (stating that the statute aims to
"protect the health and safety of individuals, especially children").
40. 453 F.3d at 1017. The Arkansas Registration Act stated that "'protecting the
public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest."' Id. (quoting ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-12-902 (2003)). If the Registration Act promoted public safety, the court
reasoned, and the residency restriction only applied to offenders registered under the
Registration Act, then the residency restriction was also intended to promote public
safety. Id.
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safety. In Mann v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia explained that
residency restrictions are designed to decrease the potential
opportunities for a sex offender to victimize a child 2
2. Residency Restrictions as a Historic Form of Banishment
After determining that the legislative intent is non-punitive, the Smith
test requires that courts compare the effect of the statute to other
historical forms of punishment.43  Opponents of residency restrictions
argue that these laws act as the "effective equivalent of banishment,""
which is a traditional means of punishment.45 Banishment is an extreme
type of residency restriction that punishes criminals "'by compelling
them to quit a city, place, or country for a specified period of time, or for
life."' 46 Sex offenders are considered banished when they are prevented
from living in their original community or from moving into a new
• 41
community.
In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit held that the Iowa statute at issue
was not a form of banishment of sex offenders because it only restricted
residency without restricting access to surrounding areas or places of
employment a.4  The restriction also contained a grandfather clause that
allowed offenders to maintain their residences if they had been
established before the enactment of the statute. 9 In addition, although
the statute might have relegated Iowa sex offenders to other areas of the
41. Id.
42. 603 S.E.2d 283,286 (Ga. 2004).
43. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). Colonial punishments included "whipping,
pillory,.., branding,.., public shaming, humiliation and banishment." Id. at 98. Of these
punishments, the most serious was banishment. Id. Banishment was used in the colonial
period "when governmental powers expelled people from their colonies for disobeying
laws." Matthew D. Borelli, Note, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy
Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 471
(2003). Georgia is one of the few states that still uses banishment as a form of punishment
to deter drug dealing and domestic violence. Id. at 478 nn.67-69.
44. E.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 719.
45. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-98; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23
(1963) ("[B]anishment and exile have throughout history been used as punishment."); see
also Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1881 (1991) (describing how a child molester in the late 1600s might have been
banished or exiled as a form of punishment).
46. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (quoting United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70
(1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting)).
47. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98.
48. 405 F.3d at 719. Although the offenders in Miller were restricted from living near
schools and daycare facilities, they were not restricted from accessing areas surrounding
the schools or childcare facilities for employment or conducting business. Id.
49. Id. (explaining that the grandfather provision "permits sex offenders to maintain
a residence that was established prior to July 1, 2002").
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state, it did not restrict sex offenders from engaging in community
activities.-'°
In a case that arose in Georgia before school bus stops were added to
the list of protected areas," the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that the state's residency statute was
not equivalent to banishment.52 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had
not been banished because he was able to find a new affordable
residence in his community, and he could still access the restricted areas
for purposes other than residence.53 However, in dicta, the court posited
that "[a] more restrictive act that would in effect make it impossible for a
registered sex offender to live in the community would in all likelihood
constitute banishment which would result in an ex post facto problem if
applied retroactively to those convicted prior to its passage. 5 4 The court
thus recognized the possibility that a more restrictive statute could
constitute effective banishment.
3. Imposition of an Affirmative Disability or Restraint
When applying the Smith test to determine if a statute is punitive in
effect, courts also analyze whether the statute imposes an "affirmative
disability or restraint., 55 To determine whether a statute imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint, courts examine how the statute affects
sex offenders, particularly whether the disability or restraint is of minor
and indirect effect.5 6 Although courts seem to agree that residency
50. Id. (explaining that the statute did not prevent sex offenders from working or
conducting commercial transactions); see also People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 780-81 (Il1.
App. Ct. 2005) (holding that preventing an offender from living in his home is not
evidence of banishment because the offender could still assimilate into a new community
or find housing elsewhere in his hometown); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667 (Iowa
2005) ("[T]rue banishment goes beyond the mere 'restriction of one's freedom to go or
remain where others have the right to be: it often works a destruction on one's social,
cultural, and political existence."' (quoting Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,
85 F.3d 874, 897 (2d Cir. 1996))).
51. See supra note 34 (comparing the old Georgia residency restriction statute with
the new statute).
52. Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Apr.
5, 2006).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *4.
55. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003); id. at 100 (noting that "the paradigmatic
affirmative disability or restraint" is imprisonment (citing Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 104 (1997))).
56. See id. at 99-100. The Smith Court held that the Alaska act under consideration
did not subject sex offenders to disability or restraint because sex offenders remained free
to change jobs or residences. Id. at 100. Although the Alaska sex offenders may have had
problems finding jobs or housing, these problems predated the statute. Id.
20071
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restrictions can impose an affirmative disability," they appear to gloss
over the importance of this factor in the analysis.58 For example, the
court in Miller explained that the residency restriction imposed an
affirmative disability or restraint greater than the disability imposed by
the registration statute in Smith.59  However, the Miller court then
compared the residency restriction to an involuntary commitment
statute.6° Because the residency statute was obviously not as disabling as
the involuntary commitment statute, which created an extreme disability,
the court in Miller concluded that the residency restriction did not
impose the requisite level of affirmative disability required under the
Smith test.6"
4. Promotion of Retribution and Deterrence
The fourth factor of the Smith test used to determine if a statute is
punitive in effect is whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of
punishment: retribution and deterrence.6  Although courts note that
57. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[Section] 692A.2A does
impose an element of affirmative disability or restraint ...."); State v. Seering, 701
N.W.2d 655, 668 (Iowa 2005) ("These restrictions clearly impose a form of disability.").
But see Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 (hesitating to find that the residency restriction was
an affirmative disability because "the Supreme Court has granted the states considerable
leeway in adopting regulations that impose substantial disabilities").
58. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 ("[W]hile we agree with the [plaintiffs] that § 692A.2A
does impose an element of affirmative disability or restraint, we believe this factor
ultimately points us to the importance of the next inquiry ...." (emphasis added)); People
v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 781 (I11. App. Ct. 2005) ("[A]lthough we would not characterize
the disability or restraint imposed ... as minor or indirect, we are not convinced that the
presence of this factor alone is sufficient to create a punitive effect .... ); Seering, 701
N.W.2d at 668 ("[A] statute that imposes some degree of disability does not necessarily
mean the state is imposing punishment." (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 100)). One dissenting
judge has complained that this approach "unduly minimizes" the disability imposed by the
residency restrictions. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 789 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
59. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
60. Id. (acknowledging that "the civil commitment scheme at issue in Hendricks ...
permitted complete confinement of affected persons") (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 363 (1997)); see also Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 ("Even though the Plaintiff is
being forced to move from his home, this disability is nowhere near as significant as the
involuntary commitment approved in Hendricks.").
61. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
62. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003). The primary purpose of punishment,
under the deterrence rationale, is to prevent the commission of future crimes. Massaro,
supra note 45, at 1895. Punishment of an offender may act to deter him from future
crimes-specific deterrence-or may act to deter others from future crimes-general
deterrence. Id. at 1895-96. By contrast, retributive punishment is a form of revenge
against the offender, id. at 1892, or "retaliation against someone who 'deserves it,"' id. at
1891. "Revenge is easier to accomplish than ... other objectives" such as deterrence and
rehabilitation. Id. at 1892.
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residency statutes could have a deterrent or retributive effect,6 they shy
away from concluding that residency restrictions promote the traditional
aims of punishment. 4 Some courts appear to forego the affirmative
disability and deterrence analysis altogether because criminal statutes are
inherently designed to create an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether or not they are punitive." For example, the Supreme Court of
Iowa, in State v. Seering, shifted the focus from whether the statute
promotes the traditional aims of punishment to whether the statute
promotes other aims, such as protecting the health and safety of
children.66 In Miller, the Eighth Circuit drew a very fine distinction
between a statute having the purpose of "alter[ing] the offender's
incentive structure" to recommit crimes (non-deterrent) and a statute
that is "designed to reduce the likelihood of reoffense" (deterrent).67
63. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 720 (noting that residency restraints are "potentially
retributive in effect"); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781 (noting that a residency restraint "might
deter future crimes").
64. See Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781 ("We reject the idea that [the statute at issue]
promotes the traditional deterrence aim of punishment."); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668
(stating that if a governmental restriction has some deterrent or retributive effect, such
effect is only secondary to the statute's regulatory objective).
65. See Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 ("[W]hatever potential this residency
restriction might have as a deterrent or as retribution, it is still consistent with a regulatory
purpose."); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781 ("[An obvious deterrent purpose does not
necessarily make a law punitive.... [A]ny number of governmental programs might deter
crime without imposing punishment."); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668; Coston v. Petro, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 878, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("Even if [the Ohio statute] has a deterrent effect...
this does not transform the statute into a punitive measure.").
66. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668 ("The nature of some governmental restrictions,
especially those designed to protect the health and safety of children, may necessarily have
some effects related to the goals of punishment." (emphasis added)).
In Seering, the court held that the Iowa statute was not punitive in effect. See id. Even
if the statute "was sufficiently penal in nature," the court believed that the statute would
still be constitutional. Id. Punishment resulted from an offender's violation of the statute,
not from his status as a sex offender. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that, "[w]hile this
punishment is based at least partially on the offender's status as an offender, the status
itself is not the impetus for punishment, nor is the punishment based on the prior offense."
Id. The court also rejected the claim that the statute increased the punishment for the
offender after commission of the crime. Id. at 669. Like statutes penalizing felons for
possessing a firearm, the court explained, "the residency restriction carries its own penalty
for a violation of the statute based on conduct subsequent to the prior criminal activities of
an offender." Id. Under this rationale, however, no sex offender residency restriction
could ever be considered ex post facto. See id. ("The residency restriction statute makes
[an offender] potentially subject to further criminal penalty based on his status as a sex
offender, but does not 'enhance the sentence imposed by the court for' .. . his prior sex
offenses.") (citation omitted).
67. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720.
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5. Rational Connection to a Nonpunitive Purpose
The Smith test also requires that a court review whether the statute has
a "rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose."' The statute need not
be narrowly tailored to achieve the nonpunitive purpose.6 9 Although the
existence of a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is "a 'most
significant' factor" in determining whether a statute's effects are
•• 70
nonpunitive, a statute that lacks such a rational connection is not
therefore automatically deemed punitive.71
Because strong deference is given to the legislature's purported
purpose for the statute," there is little disagreement-even among the
dissenting opinions73-that there exists a rational relationship between
the statute and the purpose of protecting children from known sex
offenders.74 Residency restrictions may appear to be an under-inclusive
means of preventing sex offenders from having contact with children, but
the test of rational connection allows a state legislature to address
problems through incremental steps.
75
6. Excessiveness in Relation to the Statute's Purpose
The last step in the Smith test is determining whether a residency
restriction is excessive in relation to the statute's purpose.76 In making
this determination, the issue is "whether the regulatory means chosen are
reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective., 7  The Eighth Circuit
68. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
69. Id. at 103.
70. Id. at 102 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)).
71. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
72. Hobson, supra note 22, at 984 (finding that the level of deference in the Smith
test's rational connection factor is similar to that of "rational basis review under
substantive due process analysis").
73. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that
a rational connection existed); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 672 (Iowa 2005) (Wiggins,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). But see People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d
769, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Kuehn, J., dissenting) (arguing that no rational connection
existed because the statute did not actually further the purpose of protecting children from
potential re-offenders).
74. See Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668 ("We look for a rational connection, which clearly
exists ...."); see also Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (stating
that the plaintiff conceded the existence of a rational, nonpunitive purpose); Leroy, 828
N.E.2d at 781-82.
75. Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (citing Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)) ("[T]he legislature is entitled to address
problems it identifies in incremental fashion.").
76. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
77. Id. at 105; see Lee, 895 So. 2d at 1044 ("Nothing in the record before us indicates
that the ... residency requirement ... is anything other than reasonable ...."); Seering,
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interpreted Smith to hold that individualized risk assessments for each
offender are not required when evaluating whether the regulatory means
are reasonable in light of the legislature's nonpunitive objective 8
Whether the statute is ineffective is also irrelevant because the test of a
statute's excessiveness does not require the state to find the best solution
to the problem.79 In People v. Leroy, for example, the Illinois Appellate
Court explained that the state's residency statute was not excessive
because it did not restrict the movement or activities of sex offenders,
and it was the least restrictive geographically as compared to other states'
statutesi0 The existence of a statute's grandfather clause may also
indicate that the statute is not excessive or unreasonable in light of its
81purpose.
D. Georgia's Residency Restriction
1. The Georgia Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause's Application to Georgia's Sex Offender Residency Restriction
Prior to the addition of the school bus stop restriction to the state's sex
offender residency restriction statute, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Thompson v. State ruled that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 82 The court applied a three-step analysis different from the two-
step/five-factor analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court
in Smith.83 In the first step, when determining whether the Georgia
701 N.W.2d at 668 (reasoning that the residency restriction is not excessive because of the
special protection the statute must provide for children).
78. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103-04).
79. See id. at 722 (addressing the plaintiffs' claim that "no scientific evidence"
supported the effectiveness of the residency restriction at stopping recidivism, by noting
that "'[t]he excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in
determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the
problem it seeks to remedy"' (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 105)); Coston, 398 F. Supp. 2d at
886.
80. People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 782 (I11. App. Ct. 2005).
81. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 719; Coston, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87 (dismissing the
plaintiffs' argument concerning the lack of a grandfather clause, because the statute
contained two different grandfather clauses).
82. Thompson v. State, 603 S.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Ga. 2004). Thompson was a
convicted child molester who had been "sentenced to serve a probated sentence of ten
years." Id. at 234. After the residency restriction took effect a few years into his sentence,
Thompson's probation officer informed him that he was in violation of the statute,
because he lived slightly more than 300 feet from a community center. Id. at 234. When
Thompson refused to move, the State revoked Thompson's probation; during his
probation revocation hearing, Thompson asserted as a defense that the law was ex post
facto. Id.
83. Id. at 235. First, the court determines "whether the law applies retrospectively."
Id. If the law does not apply retrospectively, then the law is not ex post facto. Id. If the
2007]
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statute was retrospective, the court analogized the case to Kansas v.
Hendricks, in which the Supreme Court held that an involuntary civil
commitment statute was not retroactive because it neither
"'criminalize[d] conduct legal before its enactment, nor deprive[d]
Hendricks of any defense that was available to him at the time of his
crimes. ' ' 4 Instead of altering the consequences of an existing offense,
the Georgia Supreme Court stated that the law created a new crime
based on an offender's status.85  Instead of punishing offenders
retrospectively, the law declared offenders guilty of an additional
felony.86 Because the law did not pass the first step of the test, the
Georgia Supreme Court did not continue with the remaining steps of the
81
analysis.
2. A Renewed Challenge: Whitaker v. Perdue
On April 26, 2006, Governor Sonny Perdue signed House Bill 1059
into law to revise Georgia's distance marker residency restriction
statute.8 The new law, section 42-1-15, states:
(a) No individual required to register pursuant to Code Section
42-1-12 shall reside or loiter within 1,000 feet of any child care
facility, church, school or area where minors congregate ...
(b)(1) No individual who is required to register under Code
Section 42-1-12 shall be employed by any child care facility,
school, or church or by any business or entity that is located
within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a school, or a church.89
The new law added school bus stops to the list of areas where minors
congregate. 90 Because school boards and private schools designate the
law does apply retrospectively, then the court determines whether the law is "punitive or
regulatory." Id. If the law is punitive, it is ex post facto; and if the law is not punitive but
regulatory, the court considers whether the effect of the law is punitive or regulatory. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997)).
85. Id. at 235-36; see also Denson v. State, 600 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that the defendant sex offender could be punished under the residency law only "if
he prospectively chooses to violate the law by continuing to reside at his current address").
86. Thompson, 603 S.E.2d at 235-36.
87. Id.
88. Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, 2006 Ga. Laws 379 (H.B. 1059); Brief in Support of
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC
(N.D. Ga. June 22, 2006), available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/
HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/BriefTRO.pdf.
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006). "Area where minors congregate" is
defined as "all public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating
rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and public and community
swimming pools." Id. § 42-1-12(a)(3).
90. Id. § 42-1-12(a)(3); see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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locations of school bus stops,9' the stops change frequently as families
move into neighborhoods and children graduate to higher-level schools.
92
The law contains no procedure for an offender to seek exemption "based
on illness, advanced age, or disability." 93  The law contains no
grandfather clause for sex offenders who had already established a
residence before the statute went into effect; the law applies to every
person on the registry.94 Additionally, sex offenders registering in
Georgia range from persons who had consensual sex as minors, to
persons who have been convicted of a violent sexual offense.95
On behalf of a group of sex offenders, the Southern Center for Human
Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia filed a
complaint on June 20, 2006, in the Northern District of Georgia against
the Governor.96 The complaint raised eight different constitutional
challenges against the Georgia statute, including an ex post facto
challenge.97 On June 27, 2006, the court granted a temporary restraining
order (TRO) enjoining portions of House Bill 1059 that otherwise
prohibit the plaintiffs from living within one thousand feet of a school
91. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(19).
92. Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 9.
93. Id. at 5; see also Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Prevent
Nine Elderly and Disabled Plaintiffs from Being Evicted from Their Homes, Nursing
Homes and Hospice Care Facilities at 11, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059-
Litigation/LegalDocuments/NursingHomePl.pdf (requesting that the court enjoin
enforcement of a particular provision of the residency restriction because the plaintiffs, all
of whom were elderly, ill, or disabled, would be forced to leave their homes).
94. See Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88,
at 5.
95. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(e)(1-8) (Supp. 2006); Jarvie, supra note 1
(explaining that the legislature decided against making an exemption for low-level
offenders out of fear that the exemption would somehow apply to everyone on the
registry).
96. Complaint, supra note 8, at 1-2, 40-42. The court later extended the class of
plaintiffs to include all sex offenders who are registered or will be required to register in
the future pursuant to section 42-1-12. Order at 6, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC
(N.D. Ga. July 28, 2006), available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/
HB1 059litigation/LegalDocuments/Order.Granting.Class.Cert.7.28.06.pdf. The plaintiff
class included Wendy Whitaker, a 26-year-old woman who was convicted of sodomy for
engaging in consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old male when she was seventeen years old.
Complaint, supra note 8, at 7. Like many of the other plaintiffs included in the suit,
Whitaker was convicted of the crime many years prior to enactment of the residency
restriction. Id. Plaintiff Jeffrey York, a 22-year-old Georgia resident, pled guilty to
sodomy at the age of seventeen for engaging in a consensual act of oral sex with a 15-year-
old boy. Id. at 13. As a result of his conviction, York may be forced to move from his
grandmother's home because it may be located too close to a school bus stop. Id.
97. Complaint, supra note 8, at 6.
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bus stop." On July 11, 2006, the court extended the TRO for ten days to
allow for oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction." The court later denied the preliminary injunction,
explaining that the law was unenforceable at the time because there was
no evidence that any school system had officially designated its school
bus stops.1°° However, in granting the TRO, the court found that the ex
post facto claim had a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits. ' '°
On August 31, 2006, the court issued an order enjoining enforcement of
the school bus stop provision so that the court could more fully consider
its constitutionality.i On March 3, 2007, the district court dismissed all
of the claims against the Georgia statute, except for the ex post facto
claim.
103
II. APPLICATION OF THE TWO-PART SMITH TEST TO THE SCHOOL BUS
STOP RESIDENCY RESTRICTION IN WHITAKER V. PERDUE
A. The Intent Behind Georgia's Statute is to Protect the Public from
Repeat Offenders
Harsh statutory language does not in itself mandate a finding that the
legislature's objective was punitive. But in the case of Georgia's new
residency restriction, it is clear that the legislature's intent was to banish
offenders from Georgia."" Indeed, the residency bill's sponsor, House of
Representatives Majority Leader Jerry Keen has stated, "Candidly ...
[sex offenders] will in many cases have to move to another state. ' '
98. Order at 3-4, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006),
available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases[HB1059 litigation/Legal
Documents/CooperORDER.6.27.06.pdf ("Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the Ex Post Facto claim.").
99. Order, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2006), available at
http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059-litigation/LegalDocuments/Co
oper extendTRO.pdf.
100. Order at 1-2, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2006),
available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/Legal
Documents/CooperdenyPI.pdf. "Plaintiffs have introduced no evidence that any local
school board has in fact designated any school bus stops, and Defendants assert that they
do not know if any school bus stops have been so designated." Id. at 5.
101. Order, supra note 98, at 3.
102. Consent Order at 1, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31,
2006), available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059-litigation/
LegalDocuments/CONSENT.ORD.BULLOCH.SIGNED.pdf (enjoining enforcement
specifically in Bulloch County, Georgia).
103. Order, supra note 10, at 22, 43.
104. Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 9-
10.
105. Id. at 10.
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Moreover, the section involving residency restrictions is codified within
the title governing penal institutions,' ° and the statute includes the
criminal penalty of imprisonment for violating the law. '°7
Although the "formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the
manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes,
are probative of the legislature's intent," these factors are not dispositive
of punitive intent. The Georgia legislature stated that its intent was to
protect the public from repeat offenders," and that "[t]he designation of
a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but
simply a regulatory mechanism" in pursuit of that goal.1  When
considerable deference is accorded to the legislature in determining
intent," and the legislature's stated intent is to protect the safety of
citizens,' 12 then the statute will be considered a regulatory scheme.'13
Georgia's pursuit of "a regulatory scheme does not make the objective
punitive" in itself.
114
B. A Statute Restricting Sex Offender Residency Around School Bus
Stops is Punitive in Effect
Even though the Georgia legislature's stated intent is nonpunitive, the
statute's effect is punitive because it promotes the traditional punishment
of banishment. "' As the court in Baker foresaw, the school bus stop
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006).
107. Id. § 42-1-15(d). House Bill 1059 stated that "[tihe provisions of this Act shall not
affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the
effective date of the Act." Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, § 30(c), 2006 Ga. Laws 413 (H.B.
1059). The purposeful omission of this language in the codified statute, which prevents an
offender from being charged of violating the residency restriction before the statute's
enactment, is further evidence of the punitive intent of the legislature. Compare id., with
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006).
108. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94 (2003). Because a criminal code might contain
provisions that do not involve criminal punishment, such as searches and seizures or
victim's rights, codification of a statute in a criminal section is not dispositive of intent.
Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
109. Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, § 1, 2006 Ga. Laws 381 (H.B. 1059) (stating that the
amendments further the state's "compelling interest in protecting the public" from the
threat of a sexual predator).
110. Id.
111. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93.
112. Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, § 1, 2006 Ga. Laws 381 (H.B. 1059).
113. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 93-94.
114. Id. at 94.
115. Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at
10-11; see Rutherford v. Blakenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) ("To permit
one state to dump its convict criminals into another is not in the interests of safety and
welfare; therefore, the punishment by banishment to another state is prohibited by public
policy." (citing People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1931))).
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provision is so much more restrictive that its effect is to "make it
impossible for a registered sex offender to live in the community.,
116
Because the state has more than 270,000 bus stops,117 offenders will have
great difficulty finding affordable housing.'1 8 Offenders will never be
allowed to settle permanently because the locations of bus stops change
every year. Furthermore, since the statute relegates offenders to certain
areas, 9 it affects their ability to engage in community activities.1
20
If the new law is enforced, a very large proportion of Georgia's 11,744
sex offenders will have to move.121 Without the relief of a grandfather
clause, for example, all of the plaintiffs in Whitaker who committed sex
crimes before the enactment of the statute must move and sell theirh 122
homes. Although the statute does not completely banish all offenders
123from the state, the statute expels them from their communities and
116. Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265-, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr.
5, 2006).
117. Judge Revisits Sex Law Today, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 11, 2006, at 2B
(estimating that Georgia has over 270,000 school bus stops).
118. Compare Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 (showing that offenders were still able to
find affordable housing when the Georgia statute did not contain the school bus stop
provision), with Kate Tillotson, Sex Offenders Congregating at Gordon Highway Motels,
WRDW, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.wrdw.com/inplainsight/3540971.html (showing how the
school bus stop provision limits sex offenders to only a handful of places to live, such as
the two motels on Gordon Highway that now house thirty-one sex offenders).
119. See Tillotson, supra note 118 (discussing the development of sex offender
communities in motels along a particular highway).
120. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006) (restricting sex offenders' ability
to loiter, work, and attend church in the community); Complaint, supra note 8, at 11-12.
121. See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 3, at 11 (showing that 11,744 sex offenders were
registered in Georgia as of 2006); Jarvie, supra note 1 (stating that all 490 offenders in
DeKalb County will have to move, and all but three of the thirty offenders in Bibb County
will have to move); Laurie Ott, Temporary Stay on Bus Stop Portion of Sex Offender Law
Reversed, WRDW, July 25, 2006, http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/3422686.html
(reporting that thirty of the forty offenders in Columbia County will have to move);
Tillotson, supra note 118 (reporting on a map of Richmond County that indicates the few
places that sex offenders could reside). The Georgia statute may render sex offenders
homeless, as was the case in Iowa after the state passed a law restricting sex offenders
from living within two thousand feet from a school or day care center. Monica Davey,
Iowa's Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at
Al.
122. Order, supra note 98, at 2-3 ("Plaintiffs have shown that they will be required to
leave their homes and that they have been unable to locate suitable alternative residences
in their respective counties of residence or in nearby counties."). But see Doe v. Miller,
405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that many of the Iowa sex offenders did not have
to change residence because the statute included a grandfather clause for offenders who
had established a residence before July 1, 2002).
123. See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the Iowa
statute did not amount to banishment because it "only restrict[ed] sex offenders from
residing in a particular area").
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cities.'24 An offender who is permanently expelled from his community
or home is effectively banished. 25
The statute is also punitive in effect because it imposes an affirmative
- - 126
disability or restraint upon registered offenders. The statute is more
disabling than the registration and notification statute in Smith. 27 The
Court explained in Smith that the registration statute at issue did not lead
"to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex
offenders that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of
routine background checks.', 128  The disability resulted from the
conviction, not from the statute's registration and notification•129
requirements. The Court reasoned that the effect of the statute was
not disabling because offenders were still "free to move where they wish
and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision.""o
Unlike the statute challenged in Smith, the Georgia statute causes a
substantial housing and employment disadvantage that offenders would
not have incurred through routine background checks. 3' The Georgia
residency restriction not only limits where offenders can reside, but the
statute also restricts where offenders can work and loiter.3 2 Compared
to other states' statutes that have been characterized as imposing a
124. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (explaining that "banished offenders historically could
not 'return to their original community,' and that the banishment of an offender 'expelled
him from the community"' (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003))).
125. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that a
law need only "sufficiently resemble[] banishment" to support a finding that it is punitive
in effect). The dissenting judge in Leroy refuted the argument that banishment must
include tarnishing offenders' reputations or making it difficult for offenders to assimilate
into new communities. People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 785-86 (I11. App. Ct. 2005)
(Kuehn, J., dissenting). The majority in Leroy defined banishment using a sentence from
Smith that Judge Kuehn argued had been taken out of context. Id. at 786. In Judge
Kuehn's view, the Smith Court's reference to one's tarnished reputation that prevents
assimilation in a new community "was not an intended consequence of banishment, but it
was the overall consequence of being banished, after first being publicly disgraced by
other traditional means of punishment." Id. Banishment during colonial times meant
nothing more than an expulsion from one's home. Id. at 786.
126. Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at
10-11.
127. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 100-02 (noting that the Alaska statute required offenders to
register and to notify authorities when they moved, without placing restrictions on
employment or residence).
128. Id. at 100.
129. Id. at 101.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Tillotson, supra note 118; Ott, supra note 121; Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order at 1-2, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059-litigation/Legal
Documents/TROBullochBrief.pdf.
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a)-(c) (Supp. 2006).
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disability or restraint, Georgia's statute is much more restrictive, thus
creating an affirmative disability or restraint.1
33
The effect of restricting sex offenders from living near all school bus
stops is not "minor and indirect" because the location of the bus stops
may continually change, limiting a sex offender's ability to establish a
permanent residence.3 The law forces registered offenders to sell their
homes and move to an entirely new community."' Prohibiting an
offender "from living where he has lived his entire life imposes a
substantial disability.,
136
The third factor demonstrating the statute's punitive effect is its
promotion of the traditional aims of punishment: deterrence and
retribution.1 17 In Mann v. State, Georgia's Supreme Court described the
deterrent effect of the state's residency restriction when it wrote that
"the [residency] statute aims to lessen the potential for those offenders
inclined toward recidivism to have contact with, and possibly victimize,
the youngest members of society." '138 The legislature explained that the
statute was enacted to decrease recidivism rates because "[miany sexual




The Georgia statute also promotes retribution because it applies
equally to everyone on the registry regardless of the type of crime
133. Compare Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that Iowa's
restriction against living within two thousand feet of a school or childcare facility "does
impose an element of affirmative disability or restraint" even though the restriction has a
grandfather provision), and People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(stating that the Illinois restriction against living within five hundred feet of a school
cannot be characterized as only minor or indirect), with § 42-1-15(a)-(c) (restricting
employment, loitering, and residency in relation to "area[s] where minors congregate"
without including a grandfather provision), and id. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (defining eight types of
areas where minors congregate).
134. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
135. E.g., Complaint, supra note 8, at 7 (describing how plaintiff Wendy Whitaker was
forced to move out of her home to comply with another residency restriction, although she
still has to pay mortgage on the home).
136. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 789 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
137. See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 672 (Iowa 2005) (Wiggins, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Even if these effects are secondary and consistent with the
regulatory objective, it still amounts to deterrence and retribution promoting the
traditional aims of punishment.").
138. Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. 2004) (explaining the purpose of the
residency statute as it existed before the 2006 revision). Contra Jill S. Levenson & Leo P.
Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One
Step from Absurd?, 49 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 174-75
(2005) (suggesting that residency restrictions do not serve as a deterrent and may actually
"increase the types of stressors that can trigger reoffense").
139. Act of Apr. 26, 2006, No. 571, § 1, 2006 Ga. Laws 381 (H.B. 1059).
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committed. 4 It subjects all sex offenders to the residency restriction
without any concern for the likelihood that any particular offender poses
a danger to others.14' The law is not concerned with the current
dangerousness of the offender, but only with the past crime committed.
42
The law retributively targets past offenses more than it aims to prevent
future offenses.
143
The only Smith factor that supports the statute's constitutionality is the
residency restriction's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, that
of protecting the public.' 44 Although the school bus stop restriction may
negatively impact public safety in practice,'45 the legislature could have
reasonably concluded that the restriction would promote public safety by
minimizing the risk of repeated sex offenses.' 46 The Supreme Court
stated in Smith that the promotion of public safety is a valid purpose for
a residency restriction,'4 ' but as Justice Souter cautioned, reliance solely
on the statute's rational connection to determine its constitutionality
would be "naive . . . given the pervasive attitudes toward sex
offenders.'
48
Lastly, the school bus stop residency restriction is an excessive
punishment because it fails to differentiate among different levels of sex
140. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006) (stating that the law applies to
everyone required to register under section 42-1-12); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 791 (Kuehn, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that automatic eviction, without an understanding of the nature of
the prior offense, promotes retribution to some degree).
141. Duster, supra note 22, at 733; see Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 791 (Kuehn, J., dissenting)
("A restriction imposed without consideration for the likelihood of a particular offender
to reoffend has to be grounded, at least in part, in furtherance of retribution.").
142. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing
the Alaska registration and notification statute as having a retributive effect because it
focuses on "past crime alone, not current dangerousness").
143. See id.
144. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
145. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 138, at 174-75 (showing that residency
restrictions prevent sex offenders from living near areas where children congregate while
still allowing offenders to live in neighborhoods filled with children); Jarvie, supra note 1
(discussing how the stringency of the Iowa residency restriction may have caused some sex
offenders to stop registering).
146. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing the rational
connection between the Iowa residency restriction and public safety).
147. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
148. Id. at 108-09 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the importance
of looking to factors other than a statute's rational connection to public safety because of
strong negative attitudes toward sex offenders); Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 9-10 (quoting statements made by Georgia House
Majority Leader Jerry Keen, sponsor of the school bus restriction, evincing his negative
attitude toward sex offenders).
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offenses,4 9 lacks a grandfather clause,5 applies as long as an offender is
required to register, and contains no exceptions."' The restraint imposed
by the school bus residency restriction is so severe that individual
assessment of the risk an offender poses to the public must be required,
to ensure that the statute's application to that offender is reasonable.'52
Unlike the statute in Leroy, Georgia's statute further punishes offenders
through its additional ban on working and loitering in areas where
153
children congregate . Finally, the school bus stop residency restriction
is not a reasonable way to promote the safety of children, because the
restriction is likely to have no effect on improving the recidivism rates of
'r / 54
sex offenders. Instead, the residency restrictions will remove sex
149. Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 11
("Unlike the sex offender residency restrictions of other states, Georgia does not
differentiate between people convicted of violent sexual offenses, such as rape, and
teenagers who violated the law by consensual sexual activity with someone of like age.").
150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006); supra note 81 and accompanying text
(discussing the grandfather provisions of other statutes).
151. See § 42-1-15; NIETO & JUNG, supra note 3, at 16 (listing some of the exceptions
that other states have included in their residency restrictions).
152. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104 (comparing the Alaska residency restriction with the
restraint in Hendricks and determining that in the latter, "[t]he magnitude of the restraint
made individual assessment appropriate").
153. Compare People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 782 (Il1. App. Ct. 2005) (explaining
that the Illinois statute only restricts residency, not the "movement and activities" of
offenders), with § 42-1-15 ("(a) No individual required to register.., shall.., loiter within
1,000 feet of any.., area where minors congregate... [or] (b)(1) ... be employed by any
child care facility, school, or church or by any business or entity that is located within 1,000
feet of a child care facility, a school, or a church.").
154. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 138, at 176 ("What we can learn from these
sex offenders' responses is that they will circumvent restrictions if they are determined to
reoffend."). At least three states have questioned whether residency restrictions actually
deter reoffenders. MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS:
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES 11 (rev. 2004), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/
publications/legislativereports ("[Bilanket proximity restrictions on residential locations of
level three offenders do not enhance community safety .. "); NIETO & JUNG, supra note
3, at 18 (stating that Minnesota and Colorado declined to enact residency restriction laws
because studies showed that such laws failed to reduce recidivism); VA. CRIMINAL
SENTENCING COMM'N, ASSESSING RISK AMONG SEX OFFENDERS IN VIRGINIA 51
(2001), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/sex-off-report.pdf (reporting that only
fifteen percent of victims were assaulted by strangers). In a study of supervised sex
offenders in the Denver metropolitan area, the Colorado Department of Public Safety
found that
sex offenders who have committed a criminal offense (both sexual and non-
sexual) while under criminal justice supervision appear to be randomly scattered
throughout the study areas -there does not seem to be a greater number of these
offenders living within proximity to schools and childcare centers than other
types of offenders....
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offenders from positive support systems'55 without preventing them from
living in homes close to where minors reside. 56
C. Georgia's Residency Restriction Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
Although there is a rational connection between the bus stop distance
marker legislation and the legislature's concern for public safety, the
statute is punitive in effect under each of the other Smith factors.' 57 The
residency restriction effectively banishes sex offenders from the
community.'58 While acting as an affirmative disability or restraint, the
restriction promotes both deterrence and retribution.'59 Furthermore,
the residency restriction is an unreasonable way to promote public
safety.' 6  In weighing the Smith factors, Georgia's school bus stop
residency restriction clearly violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
III. IF THE RATIONAL CONNECTION FACTOR IS CONSIDERED
DISPOSITIVE, THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE WILL BECOME A MERE
SURPLUSAGE
A. Punitive Residency Restrictions Are Upheld Because Courts Are
Treating the Rational Connection Factor as Dispositive
Despite the restriction's apparent unconstitutionality, Georgia's
residency restriction may be upheld because courts are misapplying the
Smith test's five factors when determining whether a statute is punitive in
... Placing restrictions on the location of correctionaly [sic] supervised sex
offender residences may not deter the sex offender from re-offending and should
not be considered as a method to control sexual offending recidivism.
SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., COLO. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY
ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN
THE COMMUNITY 37 (2004) (emphasis added), available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/
SexOffender/SOPdfs/FullSLAFinal.pdf.
155. See SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., supra note 154, at 3-4 (showing that sex
offenders who had a positive support system had significantly lower recidivism rates).
156. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 138, at 175. In the Levenson and Cotter
study, sex offenders commented on the irony of residency restrictions: "'I couldn't live in
an adult mobile home park because a church was 880 [feet] away and had a children's class
that met once a week. I was forced to move to a motel where right next door to my room
was a family with three children . I..." d. Another offender stated, "'You don't want me
to live near a school where the kids are when I'm at work. The way it is now, when I get
home from work, they're home, too-right next door."' Id.
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. See supra Part II.B.
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (arguing that residency restrictions fail
to prevent recidivism).
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161effect. Similar to the other states' restrictions that have been upheld by
courts, Georgia's restriction has a rational connection to public safety. 62
While the rational connection factor is significant, 63 no factor, including
the rational connection factor, is dispositive.6 Although lower courts
purport to weigh all five factors, the courts have consistently misapplied
165the rational connection factor as dispositive. Most strikingly, the court
161. See People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 789-90 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (Kuehn, J.,
dissenting) (noting the court's reluctance to apply certain Smith factors in the analysis of
the Illinois statute's punitive effect). Judge Kuehn criticizes the majority in Leroy for
giving the affirmative disability factor "only passing attention, dismissing it" with very
little comment. Id. at 789. He refers to their analysis as a "cursory deflection" of the
"significant and offensive" disability imposed by the residency restriction. Id. Reflecting
on the majority's analysis of whether the Illinois statute promoted the traditional goals of
punishment, deterrence and retribution, Judge Kuehn views the majority as having "recast
the inquiry from a discussion of whether the restriction at issue promotes deterrence....
to a discussion of how all regulatory schemes can carry a deterrent effect and how those
regulations are not necessarily punitive in nature." Id. at 790. Similarly, he faults the
majority's approach to the issue of retribution as "avoid[ing] any analysis of the real
question posed, by misdirection." Id.
162. E.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781-82;
State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 668 (Iowa 2005).
163. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
267, 290 (1996)).
164. See id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).
165. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 720-22; Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265-, 2006
WL 905368, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668.
In Miller, the court concluded that the law had a rational connection to reducing the
chance of reoffense, though it conceded that the law had a deterrent effect. Miller, 405
F.3d at 720. After further acknowledging the statute's potentially retributive effect, id., by
agreeing that the statute imposes "an element of affirmative disability or restraint," id. at
721, the court discounted the relative importance of these factors, stating that "this ...
ultimately points us to the importance of the next inquiry: whether the law is rationally
connected to a nonpunitive purpose," id. The court ultimately concluded that the
residency restriction was not excessive because it had a rational connection to reducing the
risk of reoffense. Id. at 722.
In Seering, the court held that the Iowa restrictions "clearly impose[d] a form of
disability," but then stated that it "[was] mindful of the objectives of the residency
restriction." Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668. The court avoided the question of excessiveness
by stating:
The nature of some governmental restrictions, especially those designed to
protect the health and safety of children, may necessarily have some effects
related to the goals of punishment. These effects, however, are secondary and
largely "consistent with the regulatory objective." ...
... We think it is more difficult to conclude that the restrictions are excessive
considering the special needs of children . . . and the imprecise nature of
protecting children from the risk that convicted sex offenders might reoffend.
Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
In Baker, the court glossed over the issue of deterrence and retribution by stating:
"[W]hatever potential this residency restriction might have as a deterrent or as retribution,
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in ACLU v. City of Albuquerque concluded the residency restriction was
not punitive in effect by relying on the rational connection factor without
applying any of the other Smith factors. 66
B. The Textualist Argument Against Reliance on the
Rational Connection Factor
A court should not rely solely on the Smith test's rational connection
factor when analyzing a statute on the ground that it violates an explicit
textual protection included in the Constitution. 6 The Framers were so
concerned with the abuses of legislative power occurring in Great Britain
that they included two clauses in the Constitution to protect against the
tyranny of ex post facto laws. '68 The Framers thought it necessary to
include these clauses even though several states already included ex post
facto clauses in their state constitutions.16  In addition to preventing
legislative abuse of power, the Ex Post Facto Clause is included in the
Constitution because it "upholds the separation of powers by confining
the legislature to penal decisions with prospective effect and the judiciary
and executive to applications of existing penal law.""7° A clause that the
Framers felt was so important deserves a higher level of scrutiny than is
afforded by a rational connection factor. 171  The concerns about
it is still consistent with a regulatory purpose.... It is only by considering the disability
within the context of the statute's purpose that this Court can determine whether an ex
post facto violation has occurred." Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at *4.
166. See 137 P.3d 1215, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
167. See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (1987) (discussing how a
rational basis test can be used "merely to disguise abstention" by the Supreme Court).
The Court's use of a rational basis test may result in a finding in favor of the government
with very little judicial review. See id. at 46. "Use of a meaningful rational basis test is...
more important for federalism than for equal protection issues," Professor Redish and Ms.
Drizin observed, because "[i]f the Court abstains in the federalism area, . . . those
provisions are effectively rendered meaningless as limitations on congressional authority,
which was their clearly intended purpose." Id. at 47.
168. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 n.8 (1981) (quoting Kring v. Missouri, 107
U.S. 221, 227 (1883)); see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798) (Iridell, J.) ("The
temptation to such abuses of power is unfortunately too alluring for human virtue; and,
therefore, the framers of the American Constitutions have wisely denied to the respective
Legislatures, Federal as well as State, the possession of the power itself."); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (applicable to States); id. § 9, cl. 3 (applicable to Congress).
169. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391-92 (acknowledging the different state
constitutions which already prohibited ex post facto laws before the Framers wrote the
Federal Constitution); THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 16, at 248-
49 (explaining that ex post facto laws were already "expressly prohibited by the
declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions").
170. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.10.
171. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 396 (Paterson, J.) ("[T]he power of passing such [ex
post facto] laws should be withheld from legislators; as it is a dangerous instrument in the
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legislative abuse and "democratic despotism" that plagued the Framers
more than two hundred years ago are still present in society and should
not be ignored .
C. The Ex Post Facto Clause is a Mere Surplusage if Courts Rely on the
Rational Connection Factor
The protection against legislative tyranny provided under the Ex Post
Facto Clause is lost when courts use the rational connection factor as
dispositive of a statute's punitive effect. Because sex offender residency
restrictions by nature are rationally connected to minimizing the risk of
repeat offenses,173 residency restrictions may be upheld regardless of the
weight of the other Smith factors. The Ex Post Facto Clause is useless if
every residency restriction is upheld without analyzing the other factors
that influence a statute's punitive effect.74  Therefore, applying the
rational connection factor as dispositive of a statute's punitive effect
renders the Ex Post Facto Clause a mere surplusage.
D. The Development of Other Residency Restrictions Rationally
Connected to Public Safety
If Georgia's school bus stop residency restriction is upheld because of
the strength of its rational connection to public safety, state legislatures
might begin implementing residency restrictions for other types of
crimes. Since the rate of recidivism for sex offenders is lower than that of
other serious criminals,75 the legislature might implement residency
hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring, and party men, and has been two [sic] often used to
effect the most detestable purposes.").
172. See Wayne A. Logan, "Democratic Despotism" and Constitutional Constraint: An
Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
439, 443 (2004) ("With the dust now settling from a decade in which U.S. prison
populations grew to unprecedented proportions, and legislators attached particular value
to being perceived as tough on crime, concern over the democratic despotism feared by
the Framers remains as warranted as ever." (footnotes omitted)).
173. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005).
174. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 468
(describing ex post facto laws as "the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny").
175. NIETO & JUNG, supra note 3, at 2 ("On average, recidivism rates for all types of
sex offenders are lower than for other offenders."); David P. Bryden, The Twenty-Second
Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases:
Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L. REV. 171, 192 (1993) (citing ALLEN J.
BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983,
6 (1989), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf) (showing that within
three years of their release, 31.9 percent of those convicted of burglary were rearrested for
burglary, 24.8 percent of those convicted of drug offenses were rearrested for a drug
offense, and 19.6 percent of those convicted of robbery were rearrested for robbery, but
only 7.7 percent of those convicted of rape were rearrested for rape). Although sex
[Vol. 57:239
Georgia Legislature Strikes With A Vengeance!
restrictions for other crimes that pose a greater threat to public safety. 76
Under the pretext of public safety, bank robbers could be restricted from
living near banks, methamphetamine users could be restricted from
living near drug stores, and minors in possession of alcohol could be
restricted from living near bars and liquor stores. 7  For example,
Tennessee has already created a registry for methamphetamine users
similar to the registry for sex offenders. The next logical step after
creating a registry of drug users and notifying the public of this
information is to create a residency restriction for those listed on the
registry. 9 Because of the high degree of deference afforded to the
legislature under the Smith test, a court would not question that a
residency restriction is imposed to promote public safety.'8° If courts
continue to use the rational connection factor as dispositive of a statute's
lack of punitive effect,' then residency restrictions for bank robbers,
drug users, and underage drinkers may become plausible regulatory
measures.
offense crimes in other studies may show a higher or lower recidivism rate, these studies
are not comparing the sex offense crimes to other major crime categories studied in the
same period and by the same methods. Park & Bryden, supra.
176. Cf Matthew Bruun, Sex Offender Plan Raises Questions, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZET'E, June 23, 2006, at B5 (quoting a local attorney comparing a
statute that restricts sex offenders from living near schools to a hypothetical statute that
would restrict bank robbers from living near banks, "'You can walk to a bank, take out a
loan, rob it; you just can't live within 2,000 feet of it."'). Unlike other forms of restrictions,
residency restrictions are unique because they create a pressure among other communities
to impose restrictions, out of fear that they otherwise will become a magnet for the
criminals who are desperately looking for a place to reside. See NIETO & JUNG, supra
note 3, at 3-4 (explaining that cities are creating laws limiting where sex offenders may
live, which creates a concern that sex offenders will move from a town with tougher
restrictions to a town with lesser or even no restrictions). Excessive restrictions may be
imposed when legislators fear the political consequences of voting against the restriction.
For example,
Regina Thomas, . . . the only senator to vote against the Georgia bill, said that
several legislators shared her concerns about how sex offenders were classified
and how the law would be enforced, but feared the political consequences of
voting against the bill.
"Nobody-Democrat or Republican-wanted to be seen to be voting for child
molesting," she said.
Jarvie, supra note 1.
177. Cf Bruun, supra note 176.
178. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-431(d) (2006) (discussing maintenance by
pharmacists of a registry of "any person purchasing a nonexempt product that contains
any immediate methamphetamine precursor").
179. See Hobson, supra note 22, at 968-69 (describing the progression of sex offender
legislation from registration laws to notification laws to residency restrictions).
180. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
in Whitaker v. Perdue, must find that the Georgia school bus stop sex
offender residency restriction is unconstitutional as a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause because the statute is punitive in effect. Otherwise,
state legislatures will continue to impose their own "arbitrary or
vindictive" sentiments upon politically unpopular groups by creating
more excessive residency restrictions. Worse, these restrictions will
allow judges who have no sympathy for certain types of criminals to
impose their own policy views under the banner of a regulatory law.a"3
The Ex Post Facto Clause will lose its purpose as a protector against the
fluctuating policy of public officials trying to win votes,1 4 and eventually,
it will become a meaningless clause in the Constitution.
182. See People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Logan, supra note
172, at 496 (describing the Ex Post Facto Clause as "guard[ing] against legislative
overreach motivated by political self-interest").
183. See ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1232 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)
(Robinson, J., specially concurring) ("I have no sympathy for convicted sex offenders and,
as far as I am concerned, that is all well and good.").
184. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 16, at 249 (stating that
Americans are "weary of the fluctuating policy" that results from ex post facto laws).
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